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Introduction 
The 147 member governments of WTO agreed on 1 August 2004 to commence negotiations on 
trade facilitation. This decision followed a heated and protracted debate on trade facilitation among WTO 
member countries that started after the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 and contributed, together 
with three other so-called “Singapore issues”, to the failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun in 
2003. 
 
The 1 August 2004 decision of the WTO General Council, often referred to as the “July 
Package”, was seen as a significant breakthrough by many as well as a sign of the multilateral trading 
system’s recognition of the importance of trade facilitation issues and its increased readiness to tackle 
non-tariff barriers. While some developing countries had initially objected to negotiations on trade 
facilitation, the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation was ultimately found to be one of the most 
productive WTO negotiating groups, resulting in a significant number of joint proposals by developed 
countries and developing countries, and thus clearly making progress toward a consensus. 
 
That being said, the current WTO trade facilitation negotiations
1 have limited the negotiation 
agenda to mainly clarifying and improving relevant aspects of Article V (freedom of transit), Article VIII 
(fees and formalities) and Article X (publication and administration of trade regulations) of GATT 1994.
2 
While it seems reasonable that negotiations at the multilateral level on this “new” and complex issue be 
kept limited and focused to increase the probability of a timely consensus, at least at first, it is important 
that trade policy makers keep a broader perspective on trade facilitation, as a significant number of the 
priority issues raised by those actually involved in trade transactions (i.e., the traders) are not covered by 
the current multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
After defining trade facilitation and highlighting the linkages between trade facilitation and WTO 
beyond the three GATT Articles under negotiation, this paper succinctly explores three emerging (in the 
case of customs valuation, re-emerging) issues, drawing from recent ARTNeT working papers as well as 
other relevant literature: (a) trade facilitation and regional trade agreements and initiatives; (b) trade 
facilitation and customs valuation; and (c) trade facilitation and services. This paper then briefly 
discusses trade facilitation in the broader contexts of business facilitation and trade costs, before 





1 The negotiating agenda also included enhancing technical assistance and support for capacity-building as well as 
effective cooperation between customs or any other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation and customs 
compliance issues. See Annex D of the WTO General Council’s decision at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf. 
2 It is currently unclear as to when (or whether) the negotiations on this restricted agenda will come to fruition since 
they are part of the “single undertaking" of the Doha Round of negotiations, in which agreements on agriculture and 
a number of other issues remain elusive.    
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A. Trade facilitation: Increasing the efficiency of trading processes 
 
There is no agreed definition of trade facilitation. In fact, trade facilitation has been referred to as 
“the plumbing of international trade” as it focuses on the efficient implementation of trade rules and 
regulations. Indeed, what appears to differentiate trade facilitation from other trade issues is its focus on 
efficient processes, e.g., how to efficiently implement policies or regulations, or how to efficiently 
exchange goods and services across national borders, and related documentation. As such, tariff barriers 
are not covered by trade facilitation, but customs valuation generally is covered.
3 
 
The International Chamber of Commerce also emphasizes process efficiency in its definition of 
trade facilitation: “To improve the efficiency of the processes associated with trading in goods across 
national borders”.
4 This definition is also reminiscent of the concept of trade efficiency as outlined in the 
Colombus Ministerial Declaration of 1994.
5 
 
The trade efficiency model presented in figure I suggests that telecommunications infrastructure 
forms the basis of trade efficiency, as the development of this infrastructure is necessary for efficient 
business information dissemination and trade facilitation. In turn, the model suggests that trade 
facilitation involves making customs, transport, and banking and insurance (services and infrastructure) 
more efficient. In that context, trade facilitation cannot be limited simply to either at-the-border or 
customs control processes, since these two sets of processes are only two of a number of other processes 
(e.g., payment and logistics) that affect the efficiency of a trade transaction. 
 
 




The trade efficiency model proposed in figure I extends the 1994 trade efficiency model by 
adding two new elements – governance and human resource development. Indeed, like 
telecommunications – and, arguably, even more so than telecommunications – these are necessary 
conditions to trade facilitation. Good governance is central to trade facilitation, as it is unlikely that even 
the adoption of “best practice” rules and regulations and major investment in automated customs systems 
will yield expected trade facilitation benefits unless issues involving corruption in both the public and 
private sectors are taken into account and addressed more directly. In that context, increasing 
 
3 As mentioned above, the operational WTO definition of trade facilitation is very restrictive, since it includes only 
three GATT Articles, indeed leaving out customs valuation processes (GATT Article VII). 
4 See the ICC Policy Statement at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/icc_tradefacilitation_e.pdf. 
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transparency
6 and reducing incentives/increasing penalties for non-compliance by any party with rules 
and regulations seem essential. 
 
Human resource development, on the other hand, is crucial to enabling implementation of trade 
facilitation measures. The lack of trained human resources is a recurrent issue in implementing a customs 
reform programme and related trade facilitation measures – as noted in the country studies of India and 
Nepal that are included in this publication. Its importance has long been recognized – with the UNCTAD 
Commission on Enterprise, Business Facilitation and Development having added it to the six initial 
components of the trade efficiency model in 1997 – together with transit and legal issues (Sengupta, 
2007). 
 
  B. Trade facilitation and the WTO 
 
The limited scope of trade facilitation in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations was noted 
earlier. However, increasing the efficiency of trade-related processes has long been on the agenda of the 
multilateral trading system, as shown by the already long list of WTO provisions and agreements that are 
related to trade facilitation (table 1).  
 
Table 1. List of WTO provisions related to trade facilitation 
Article/Agreement Subject 
GATT 1994, Article V  Freedom of transit 
GATT 1994, Article VII  Valuation for customs purposes 
GATT 1994, Article VIII  Fees and formalities connected with imports and 
exports 
GATT 1994, Article IX  Marks of origin 
GATT  1994,  Article  X  Publications and administration of trade 
regulations 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII 
of the GATT 1994 
Customs valuation 
Agreement on Rules of Origin  Rules of origin 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures  Import licensing 
Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection  Pre-shipment inspection procedures 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade   Rules related to technical standards 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures  
Rules related to application of SPS measures 
General Agreement on Trade in Services  Rules related to facilitation trade in services 
Source: Compiled based on World Trade Organization, G/L/244, 1998. 
 
Negotiating trade facilitation issues at the multilateral level appears most appropriate when the 
issues are of concern to a large number of participants, and when they involve the development of 
common standards and procedures. While there are a number of other international organizations 
involved in trade facilitation, in particular the World Customs Organization (WCO), WTO is the only 
organization providing a credible framework for binding commitments in trade facilitation. In addition to 
the technical assistance/capacity-building implications, one important benefit from negotiating trade 
                                                 
6 Transparency was also the first of seven trade facilitation principles adopted by the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Ministers of Trade in 2001 (ESCAP, 2002). Helble and others (2007) provide an interesting discussion 
of the concept of transparency in relation to trade facilitation.    
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facilitation at WTO for developing country national governments may also be that it provides them with 
the external mandate necessary to advance often very sensitive trade facilitation reforms at home. 
 
Prasad (2006) builds on ESCAP (2006) in order to present a comparative analysis of the trade 
facilitation needs of the private sector in Fiji and a number of other developing countries in Asia. The 
private sector survey conducted as part of the study puts technical barriers to trade (TBT), SPS measures, 
and customs valuation at the top of the concerns of the Fijian private sector. This is consistent with the 
findings in the other five countries covered (see figure II). As such, it may be hoped that trade facilitation 
negotiations at WTO will expand to these areas in future rounds, and allow for revisiting or expansion of 
the related WTO agreements. 
 
Figure II. Most problematic areas in conducting trade in selected developing countries in Asia and 
the Pacific* 
Customs valuation 
Inspection and release of goods 
Tariff classification 
Technical or sanitary requirements 
Payment of fees and penalties 
Obtaining an import licence 
Submission of documents for clearance 
Identification of origin of the goods 
 
*Based on exploratory private sector surveys in Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia and Nepal 
conducted in 2005. 
Problematic Most problematic
Sources:  ESCAP, Studies in Trade and Investment, No. 57, 2006; and Prasad, 2007. 
 
In addition to the customs-related issues of valuation, classification and inspection, and release, a 
number of non-tariff barriers under the purview of WTO continue to have a significant effect on the 
efficiency of trade processes.
7 As figure III shows, the proliferation of TBT (i.e., technical regulations, 
product standards and related testing and certification procedures) that make trading a more complex and 
difficult process may deserve particular attention in future rounds. 
 
From a trade facilitation perspective, this renewed attention may focus on making the 
implementation of these standards and regulations as simple and efficient as possible. The WTO 
agreements on TBT and SPS measures are direct contributions to trade facilitation in the sense that they 
provide standard processes for countries to issue and inform each other of new regulations and standards. 
However, the fact that importers and exporters in developing countries identify TBT and SPS measures 
among the most problematic trade issues they face suggests that more efforts are needed at the global and 
other levels to harmonize, mutually recognize and standardize measures as well as to ensure they are not 
unnecessarily restrictive. A very practical approach to the measures would help immensely in this 
respect, e.g., not setting the authorized level of a particular chemical beyond the capacity of standard 
testing equipment available at the time the measure is published.
8 
 
7 Non-tariff quantitative restrictions, i.e., quotas, are not generally associated with trade facilitation. 
8 Setting the authorized level of a chemical to zero rather than to a scientifically determined and measurable value 
will lead to situations where shipments initially accepted may suddenly be rejected as testing facilities or equipment 
are being upgraded.    
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Source: Duval, 2007, based on Ng, 2006, and Dhar and Kallumal, 2007. 
 
C. Trade facilitation, and regional/bilateral trade initiatives and 
agreements 
The number of bilateral and regional trade agreements and related initiatives has exploded in 
recent years (figure IV).
9 Of the 133 trade agreements recorded in the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment 
Agreement Database (APTIAD), only 35 (26 per cent) cover trade facilitation.
10 However, seven (70 per 
cent) of the 10 trade agreements that have come into force since 2004 in the ESCAP region include trade 
facilitation. A closer look at how trade facilitation issues may be addressed through preferential trade 
agreements and other bilateral and regional initiatives is therefore warranted. 
 
Wille and Redden (2006) compare the treatment of trade facilitation in four selected regional 
trade initiatives – the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
(PACER) – as well as in one bilateral free trade agreement, the Australia-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (ASFTA). On the basis of these trade initiatives and ASFTA, they develop model trade 
facilitation principles and measures that may be instructive for developing country negotiators and policy 
makers. 
 
Given the varying degrees of progress in trade facilitation reform in the agreements, the 
comparative analysis provided in Wille and Redden (2006) reinforces the importance of clearly 
formulated, specific trade facilitation principles and measures if trade facilitation reform is to be 
successful. The effectiveness of specific measures implemented by parties to APEC, ASFTA and, to a 
lesser extent, AFTA suggest clearly designed trade facilitation principles and measures that, if not 
 
9 See also Mikic, 2007, and Bonapace and Mikic, 2007. 
10 The list of trade agreements that cover trade facilitation is provided in the annex to this chapter.    
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binding, at least require a commitment to quantitative outcomes are more likely to succeed than purely 
aspirational approaches. 
 
Wille and Redden find that each initiative or agreement appears to have played a positive role in 
accelerating the reform process and, to some extent, in driving reform at the multilateral level. However, 
they note that while some of the costs associated with trade can be reduced by bilateral initiatives, many 
current trade facilitation initiatives at the bilateral or plurilateral level address essentially multilateral 
issues. Pressure from a major trading partner, promises of reciprocity or of commitments to trade-related 
capacity-building, as in PACER, may contribute to the attractiveness of implementing trade facilitation 
measures. However, as APEC members and others have recognized, it is crucial to coordinate trade 
facilitation with multilateral trade facilitation negotiations or at least with the major regional trading 
partners.  
 
While some trade facilitation priorities will undoubtedly be based on cost and ease of 
implementation, the study stresses the need for each country to assess its particular needs, to harmonize 
and sequence reforms in cooperation with key trading partners, and to link capacity-building, technical 




Figure IV. Asia-Pacific “noodle bowl” of preferential trade agreements 
Source: ESCAP APTIAD, February 2007. 
 
Chaturvedi (2007) finds in his analysis of trade facilitation provisions in South Asian free trade 
areas that coverage of trade facilitation issues is minimal in all but one of the five trade agreements (two 
regional and three bilateral) reviewed against the list of trade facilitation measures relevant to GATT 
Articles V, VIII and X, and which are under negotiation at WTO. On the basis of a review of 
intraregional trade flows and unilateral trade facilitation initiatives by South Asian countries, Chaturvedi 
finds that transit facilitation measures, including the development of infrastructure at land customs 
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development of intraregional trade. These issues could be tackled in part through the inclusion of relevant 
provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements. 
 
1. The issue of rules of origin 
 
Although an increasing number of preferential trade agreements contain rather general and 
customs-focused trade facilitation provisions, these agreements may not ultimately contribute to the 
efficiency of trading processes, mainly due to the rules of origins they contain. Rules of origin are 
necessary for determining which products will enjoy reduced bilateral tariffs and which will not, and to 
prevent trans-shipment of goods through the customs territory in a bloc with the lowest tariff. 
 
James (2006)explains that while many of the emerging FTAs appear to be consistent with Article 
XXIV of GATT and Article V of GATS in principle, the complex and idiosyncratic rules of origin in 
these agreements threaten to complicate international commerce and divert trade rather than create it. 
Preferential trade agreements among developing countries (e.g., AFTA) have vague rules and high 
administrative costs that (together with small margins of preference) deter business from seeking to take 
advantage of preferences, thus limiting the amount of trade these agreements create. 
 
His review of newly emerging FTAs involving key Asian hubs (China, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore and Thailand) reveals that rules of origin not only differ between hubs but also within 
them, suggesting that rules of origin have been framed with the interests of industrial lobbies in mind 
rather than with trade facilitation as the goal. As a result, countries that enter into agreements with hubs 
may find that their exporters will shift purchases of intermediate goods away from the lowest cost 
suppliers in order to comply with rules of origin in gaining preferential access to the hub. As a result, 
their products may become less competitive in third country markets, and efficient existing production 
networks may be displaced by less efficient ones that thrive on tariff discrimination rather than on low 
production costs.  This encourages closed as opposed to open regional blocs, and is of particular concern 
since less developed and small countries are less able than developed countries to partake of preferential 
treatment. James concludes that harmonization of preferential rules of origin may be unrealistic, however, 
and a less ambitious solution may instead be feasible, such as gradually lowering value-added content 
rules for less developed countries, or allowing averaging over time. 
 
D. Trade facilitation and customs valuation 
 
Customs valuation refers to the process and method(s) used by customs authorities to determine 
the value of a particular good. Since tariffs are usually calculated as a percentage of the value of the 
goods (i.e., ad valorem), the particular method used to determine value will directly affect the amount of 
tariff duties collected on a particular shipment.
11 This is therefore of great concern to traders, as non-
transparent valuation mechanisms – typically combined with inefficient or even absent advance ruling 
mechanisms – lead to uncertainties regarding the profitability of each trade transaction. 
 
 
11 This amount is also affected by the tariff rate applicable to the good, which will depend on how a particular good 
is classified. Tariff classification is one of the measures being negotiated at WTO, although most countries already 
rely on the WCO HS system for classification purposes. While mis-classification is identified as a problematic 
issue, the customs valuation procedure appears to be of relatively greater concern to traders (see figure II). 
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The importance of efficient and transparent customs valuation processes has long been 
recognized and has led WTO members to sign a separate agreement on the implementation of GATT 
Article VII, commonly referred to as the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA). The CVA is based 
primarily on the transaction value method (TVM), i.e., value is assessed based on the value indicated in 
the invoice provided by the trader.
12 As such, the CVA is clearly aimed at facilitating trade, considering 
information provided by the trader as the basis for valuation. However, the CVA allows for five other 
methods to be considered in a hierarchical order, should Customs have doubt about the invoice value 
provided. It is therefore interesting to see that, at a time when most WTO members are supposed to have 
fully implemented the CVA, private sector surveys in developing countries (see, for example, ESCAP, 
2006) still identify customs valuation as a key issue. 
 
To shed some light on the issue, customs valuation was examined in India, Nepal, and Fiji in 
Chaturvedi (2006), Rajkarnikar (2006), and Prasad (2006), respectively. Chaturvedi (2006) reviews 
efforts made by India in making customs valuation more efficient and in implementing the CVA. Some 
of the major issues identified by traders in India regarding customs valuation are frequent rejections of 
transaction value, the lack of transparency, the slow processing of valuation cases by the special 
valuation branch and the lack of expertise among field officers. The Indian case study reveals that 
customs revenue declined continuously between 1999 and 2002, but has consistently increased since 
then. Several measures were introduced to minimize revenue loss and to tackle under-evaluation, 
resulting in a remarkable increase in additional revenue from the enhancement of declared transaction 
values. Many private sector companies indicated, however, that the additional measures imposed by the 
Customs Department are the results of misdeeds of a few traders – accounting for less than 18 per cent of 
the transactions – and that those traders should therefore be specifically targeted. 
 
Rajkarnikar (2006) examines the case of Nepal, a country that had yet to fully implement the 
CVA at the time of the study (June 2006), but that had already adopted TVM as the primary valuation 
method. He finds that legislative and other improvements being made as part of the implementation of 
the CVA will have no significant impact on the volume of trade and import prices; changes in valuation 
practices are expected to slightly increase (2.1 per cent) the cost of imported goods and exert a negative 
effect on the demand for imports (-1.9 per cent). On the other hand, the improved valuation system may 
be expected to help reduce under-invoicing and informal trade, thus exerting a positive impact on 
customs revenue. Importantly, the case study highlights the need for implementing TVM (and, by 
extension, the CVA) in conjunction with other trade facilitation measures – notably post-clearance audit 
– to avoid revenue linkage. 
 
All three studies point to the limits of the CVA, which can be abused by both traders and customs 
officers for their own benefit, depending on the way and the environment in which it is implemented. 
Together with advance rulings, risk management, post-clearance audit and independent appeal 
mechanisms, measures to develop trust and cooperation between customs officers and the private sector 
are the key to resolving potential undervaluation issues while not unnecessarily impeding trade. 
 
Meaningful commitments by WTO members on trade facilitation in the ongoing round would 
likely make the CVA more effective, since many of the measures being discussed under Articles VIII and 
X are linked to the CVA. At the same time, one may question the rationale for recognizing, on the one 
hand, the need to fully take into account the individual capacity of countries to implement measures 
under these two articles and, on the other hand, for making CVA implementation mandatory – even after 
a delay of four years, a period that has expired for most members.
13 
 
12 A number of adjustments are, however, authorized as per CVA Article VIII. 
13 The issue of implementation cost arises here. J. M. Finger (2000) pointed to the unwillingness of WTO to fully 
take into account the costs involved in the reforms linked to implementation of the WTO agreement. In particular, 
he noted that a customs reform project alone at that time could easily cost US$ 20 million for buildings, equipment 
and staff training.    
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E. Trade facilitation and services 
The trade efficiency model presented above highlights the linkages between trade facilitation and 
key service sectors, i.e., telecommunication, transport and logistics, and the banking and insurance 
sectors. As shown in figure V, trade transactions involve flows of goods, documents and information as 
well as financial flows, the efficiency of which depends at least as much on (private sector) service 
providers as it does on government agencies. Comprehensive trade facilitation frameworks and strategies 
therefore would need to address the issue of how to develop these key sectors, including through services 
trade liberalization. 
 
Figure V. The three flows of international trade 
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Source: Duval, ITC Regional Business Forum on e-Finance, August 2006. 
 
The relationship between liberalization in the logistics sector and trade facilitation is explored in 
some depth by De Sousa and Findlay (2006) . Using exports of tuna from South Australia to Japan as an 
illustrative example, their study demonstrates that the improvement of the performance of logistics 
services through domestic liberalization may generate a virtuous cycle, whereby international trade is 
increased, and that this, in turn, may increase the demand for logistics services. Their study further 
supports the view that benefits of improved performance of logistics services could be enhanced through 
governmental measures that assist the flow of trade across national borders. The extent and pace of 
measures taken by governments to liberalize the supply of logistics services as well as facilitate trade will 
determine whether or not a virtuous cycle will be generated and the extent of the benefits that will accrue 
from that cycle. 
 
A supply-chain approach to trade facilitation, whereby bottlenecks would be identified along the 
chain, and relevant private and public entities would take concerted action to remove them, would be 
most effective. Indeed, improving the customs clearance time for shipments of fresh food products by an 
additional 20 minutes may ultimately not facilitate trade as much as the issuance of policies or 
regulations that would facilitate the construction of cold storage and logistics facilities at airports. 
 
Relatively little research has been conducted so far on how governments in developing countries 
can support the development of supply-chain efficiency-enhancing services. The sequencing of policy 
reforms as well as the level at which underlying measures need to be negotiated (global, regional, 
bilateral and domestic) appear to be particularly relevant.    
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F. Trade facilitation in a broader context 
 
Globalization has blurred the frontiers between domestic and international issues. Coherence and 
coordination between policies has become the key to offering domestic firms a national environment in 
which they can strive – and develop the capacity to compete and benefit from globalization – while at the 
same time ensuring the sustainable development of the country as a whole. As such, it is important to 
remember that trade facilitation is one element of a complex set of interrelated issues. Given the often 
limited resources available in developing countries, it may be desirable to see trade facilitation (and the 
specific measures commonly associated with it) as a component of broader frameworks aimed at 
facilitating business development and reducing transaction costs. 
 
1. Trade facilitation and business facilitation 
 
Trade facilitation can be addressed as one important element of a private sector and business 
development strategy. For example, the World Bank identifies “trading across borders” as one of 10 
regulatory areas that influence the ability of the private sector to develop. Table 2 shows the relative 
ranking of East Asian, South Asian and Pacific Island Countries in their respective subregions in each of 
the 10 areas identified.    
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Table 2. Subregional rankings of selected Asia-Pacific countries in terms of ease of trading and other ease of doing business 











































East and South-East Asian economies 
Singapore  1 [1]  1 [1]  1 1  1  1  3  1 1  2 
Hong Kong, 
China  2 [4]  2 [3]  2 5  2  7  1  2 2  1 
Republic of 
Korea  5 [30]  3 [13]  9 3 11  9  5  7 9  3 
Malaysia  4 [24]  4 [21]  5(+) 10  3  8  2  3 4(+) 8 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China  6 [50]  5 [29]  8 12 13  4 6 8 8 9 
Indonesia  10 [123]  6 [41]  14(-) 8(+)  14  12  9(+)  6(+)  10  13 
China  8 [83]  7 [42]  10 14(+)  9  5 10(+)  10  14  4 
Thailand  3 [15]  8(+) [50]  3 2  4  3  4  5 6  5 
Philippines  11 [133]  9[ 57]  12 7  10  10  11  12  12  11 
Viet Nam  9 [91]  10 [63]  7 6  7  6  7(+)  13(+)  13  7 
Timor-Leste  14 [168]  11 [78]  11(+) 9  6  14 13 11  5  14 
Cambodia  12 [145] 
12(+) 
[139]  13 13  12  11  14  9(+)  3  (+)  12 
Lao PDR  13 [164] 
13(+) 
[158]  6(+) 11  8  13 12 14 11 10 
Mongolia  7 [52]  14 [168]  4 4  5  2  8  4  7(+)  6 
South Asian economies 
Sri Lanka  3 [101]  1(+) [60]  2(+) 8  5  5 4(-)  4  7  4 
India  7 [120]  2(+) [79]  8 6  4  4  1(+)  3 8 8 
Pakistan  2 [76]  3 [94]  5 2  7(+) 3  3(+)  2 6 5 
Maldives  1[60]  4 [110]  3 1  1  8  6  4 1 2 
Bangladesh  4 [107]  5 [112]  7(-) 3  6  7  2 1 4(-) 7 
Bhutan  6 [119]  6 [149]  4(+) 4  2(+) 2(+)  7 7  3  1 
Nepal  5 [111]  7 [151]  6 5  8  1  4  4 5 3 
Afghanistan  8 [159]  8 [174]  1 7  3 6(+)  8  8 2 6 
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Pacific Island economies 
Tonga  2 [47]  1 [44]  2 5 2  6  8  7  3  1(+) 
Marshall 
Islands.  9 [89]  2 [46]  1 1 1  9  10(+)  8  9  2 
Solomon 
Islands.  6 [79]  3 [74]  8 6 9  8  6  5  4  7 
Papua New 
Guinea  8 [84]  4 [82]  7 10 8  4 3  3  10  10 
Micronesia  10 [112]  5 [85]  3 2 4 10  2  9  7  8 
Kiribati  5 [73]  6 [97]  9 9 7  3  7  4  1  5 
Samoa  3 [61]  7 [108]  10 7  5  2 4  1 6 6 
Fiji  1[36]  8 [111]  5 4 6  5  1  2  5  3(+) 
Palau  7 [82]  9 [121]  4 8 3  1  9  10  8  9 
Vanuatu  4 [62]  10 [142]  6 3 10  7(-)  5  6  2  4 
Source: Calculated based on Ease of Doing Business database, at www.doingbusiness.org. 
Note: (+) and (-) denotes positive or negative reforms in 2006/07; ranks in [ ] are global rankings out of 178 economies. 
 
 
In table 2, the (+) and (-) signs next to the rankings indicate countries that have implemented 
positive or negative reforms, respectively, in each of the areas in 2006/07. Of the group of countries 
considered, “trading across borders” was the area in which most countries reportedly had made positive 
reforms, with “getting credit” coming second. This suggests that countries recognize the importance of 
trade facilitation and that they are willing to take unilateral initiatives in this area. 
 
Research on the most appropriate method to aggregate the various indicators into an overall  
“doing business” indicator suggest that giving the same weight to all 10 areas is appropriate (Djankov, 
2005). At the same time, however, working on improving the efficiency of trading across borders may 
have little impact on trade growth if other regulatory areas (e.g., starting or closing a business) are 
ignored. As can be seen from table 2, while some countries still rank relatively low in their subregion in 
terms of trading across borders, the overall ease of doing business in those countries is high (e.g., 
Thailand). Similarly, countries that rank high in terms of trading across borders remain a relatively 
difficult environment in which to do business overall (e.g., Indonesia), pointing to the need for increased 
coordination and coherence across agencies involved in trade and business facilitation. 
 
Figures VI and VII show, for a selection of South and East Asian countries, the number of 
documents required for imports and exports as well as the time it takes for a 20-foot container of an 
identical good to be transported from a factory in the largest business city to a ship in the most accessible 
port (or vice versa). These are four of the six indicators used in determining the ease of trading across 
borders rankings. The other two indicators are costs associated with import or export procedures, 
respectively, which are calculated as the sum of all fees associated with completing the procedures for 
exporting or importing the goods (including costs for documents, administrative fees for customs 




                                                 
14 For methodological details, please see 







Figure VI. Time and documentary requirements for imports and 
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Source: Doing Business Database. 
Figure VII. Time and documentary requirements for imports and exports in East Asian countries 
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Source: Doing Business Database. 
Figures VI and VII reveal that the number of documents for imports – generally higher than those 
required for exports – range widely across countries in the region, from two in Hong Kong, China to 16 
in two least developed countries (LDCs), the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Bangladesh. A 
casual observation of the data reveals that time required for imports and exports is highly correlated with    
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the number of documents required as well as with the costs of import and exports. This is explained by 
the fact that 75 per cent of the time/delays are attributable to administrative hurdles such as customs and 
tax procedures, clearances and cargo inspections, and only 25 per cent to poor road and port 
infrastructure (Djankov and others, 2007). 
 
Looking at the four above-mentioned indicators is particularly useful as they highlight the fact 
that trade facilitation really begins at home; the indicators, or at least their variations across countries, are 
based on domestic regulations and policies, except for landlocked countries. Importers and exporters in 
many developing countries often point to domestic – as opposed to foreign – regulations and processes as 
the main sources of trade in inefficiencies (e.g., Bhattacharya and Hossain, 2006). In that context, global 
and regional trade facilitation initiatives are important but will only be useful in support of wider ranging 
domestic initiatives. This support role may include: 
 
(a)  Strengthening the mandate for trade facilitation reforms at home to facilitate implementation 
of measures that will negatively affect the welfare of a small but politically significant group 
of individuals (e.g., officials in charge of customs and enforcement of related regulations); 
(b) The development of harmonized documents, processes and standards to be adopted and 
implemented in each country, further facilitating cross-border trade (this function has been 
performed by WCO and UN/CEFACT as well as WTO, among others); 
(c)  Facilitating the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building for trade facilitation – 
this function may be served by a future WTO trade facilitation agreement – as well as the 
sharing of knowledge and experience (including through voluntary peer review mechanisms). 
 
Governments in Asia are aware that enhancing trade-related domestic processes is one way to 
help their producers and traders gain, or at least maintain, competitiveness in the global market. Unlike 
trade liberalization, trade facilitation also has little downside for governments, as it does not result in the 
loss of customs revenue, even if trade remains the same. Implementation costs of even the more complex 
trade facilitation measures are also typically dwarfed by long-term savings (Duval, 2006). As a result, 
significant and continuous unilateral trade facilitation efforts have been made in the region by countries 
at various stages of development, based on the availability of resources at their disposal. Some of the 
progress made by South Asian countries in relation to GATT Articles V, VIII and X was reviewed by 
James (2006). 
2.  Trade facilitation and trade costs 
The concept of “trade costs” is relatively recent but has taken on increasing importance, 
particularly in the academic literature; yet, in contrast, trade facilitation remains mostly absent from the 
literature.  
 
Trade costs may be defined as “all costs incurred in getting a product to a final user, other than 
the production costs of the good itself”, broken down by Anderson and Wincoop (2004) as transportation 
(freight and time) costs, (tariff and non-tariff) policy barriers, information costs, contract enforcement 
costs, legal and regulatory costs, and local (wholesale and retail) distribution costs. In other words, trade 
costs do include all transaction costs involved in marketing a product, from identifying and negotiating a 
contract with a buyer to the buying of the product by a consumer in the foreign retail store. A breakdown 
of these costs for industrialized countries is provided in figure VIII, in percentage of the value of the 
product traded. Border-related trade barriers, which include barriers generally related to trade facilitation 
(presumably mainly under “policy barriers”) as well as many other barriers not always associated with 
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Source: P. De, 2007, drawn from J. E. Anderson and E. van Wincoop, 2004. 
 
Policy barriers, including both tariff and non-tariff barriers, therefore make up less than one fifth 
of the overall border-related trade barriers estimated in this study. The authors recognize that their 
breakdown, based on a combination of direct observation and inferred costs, is only approximate. 
Nonetheless, it provides an interesting perspective on trade facilitation and transaction costs, and 
suggests, in particular, that a large number of alternative measures may assist in the facilitation of trade in 
its broadest sense, i.e., the reduction of trade transaction costs. 
 
De (2007) elaborates on trade costs in Asian countries, focusing particularly on direct transport 
costs. His analysis shows, inter alia, that a reduction in tariffs and transport costs by 10 per cent each 
would increase bilateral trade by about 2 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively. Therefore, the propensity 
to increase the trade is likely to be higher with a reduction of transport costs, rather than tariff reduction 
in the present context. The paper also discusses freight costs in some detail, indicating that freight costs 
for imports by developing countries continue to be significantly higher than those of developed countries, 
with freight costs in developing Asia being on average 116 per cent higher than in developed countries. 
At the same time, while ocean freight prices have fallen over time for the movement of vessels among 
some selected Asian countries, auxiliary shipping charges have gone up, thereby offsetting some of the 
gains arising from technological advancement in shipping and navigation, and trade liberalization. 
 
Although some of the auxiliary shipping charges (e.g., documentation fees, congestion 
surcharges and electronic data interchange fees) can be linked to core trade facilitation measures and 
issues, De (2007) and most of the literature on trade costs go well beyond trade facilitation as defined in 
this publication. At the same time, however, the broad perspective on trade transaction costs that the trade 
cost concept provides is important for trade policy makers when investing their limited resources in trade 
cost components that will provide the highest return. 
 
3. Trade facilitation and trade infrastructure 
 
The importance and direct linkage between trade facilitation and telecommunications 
infrastructure has long been acknowledged (see figure I above). While some have argued that trade 
facilitation does not cover physical infrastructure, it has become increasingly evident that many trade-
related processes involve availability of specialized infrastructure in addition to the basic infrastructure 
that is often not available in many LDCs. 
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A number of trade facilitation measures, particularly those related to transparency and 
publication of trade regulations, do not require significant infrastructure investment. However, increasing 
port efficiency and e-business usage/service sector infrastructure – two of four indicators used by World 
Bank economists to measure the potential benefits from trade facilitation and found to be most important 
in realizing trade facilitation benefits (e.g., Wilson and others, 2003 and 2005)
15 – do involve potentially 
significant investment in infrastructure. 
 
The link between trade facilitation and infrastructure is a sensitive issue, particularly as trade 
facilitation is now on the negotiating agenda of many trade agreements and is sometimes linked (as in the 
case of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations) to commitment in terms of technical assistance and 
capacity-building. Given its implications with regard to the cost of implementing trade facilitation 
measures as well as the extent, nature and overall effectiveness of aid to be provided to developing 
member countries under an eventual multilateral agreement on trade facilitation, full acknowledgement 
of the role of trade infrastructure in trade facilitation is important (Alburo, 2007). 
 
 
15 Interestingly, the most recent World Bank trade facilitation research appears to have focused on transparency 
issues and does not emphasize trade or transport infrastructure factors (see Helble and others, 2007). This de-
emphasizing of infrastructure issues related to trade facilitation is consistent with the scope of the WTO trade 
facilitation negotiations, which have focused heavily on transparency issues with arguably limited infrastructure 
investment implications.    
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F. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper provided a perspective on trade facilitation going well beyond that of the current 
WTO negotiations, in an attempt to offer policymakers in developing countries more options to facilitate 
trade. At this juncture, it may therefore be useful to recall how trade facilitation may contribute to 
sustainable and inclusive growth, arguably an overriding goal of the policy community. 
 
While trade has been widely recognized as a key engine of growth, research on the linkages 
between trade (liberalization) and poverty has not been conclusive, generally showing a marginally 
positive effect of trade liberalization on poverty reduction. At the same time, while significant progress 
has been made in terms of poverty reduction in Asian countries that have liberalized trade, inequality 
within some of those countries also appears to have worsened (figure IX). 
 
Figure IX. Changes in inequality within selected  
Asian Countries, 1990s-2000s* 
 























Source: Asian Development Bank, 2007. 
*Measured as changes in percentage in the Gini Coefficient for expenditure or income 
distribution. Years over which changes are computed vary across countries depending on 
data availability. 
 
Increasing inequality is of some concern because it can dampen the effect of growth on poverty 
reduction and hinder future growth prospects, i.e., sustainable development. The slow growth of 
agriculture relative to other sectors, and the interactions between market-oriented reforms, global 
integration and technology, have been identified among the key drivers of inequality (ADB, 2007). 
 
In that context, how might trade facilitation contribute to resolving distributional issues? One of 
the key principles of trade facilitation is transparency. Making trade regulations and related processes 
more transparent involves simplifying and clarifying them, and making them accessible to the greatest    
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possible number of firms and individuals, thereby increasing their opportunity to trade and take 
advantage of global market opportunities. While inefficient and complex trade and business procedures 
can be overcome by large companies, who can more easily allocate time and human resources for that 
purpose through economies of scale, this is not the case with small and medium-sized enterprises. Trade 
facilitation can therefore be seen as a way to change the circumstances of trade within a country that give 
rise to inequalities in opportunities to trade.
16 
 
Relatively little research has been carried out into how trade facilitation measures that are 
commonly advocated
17 (for example, risk management systems) affect firms of various sizes, but 
particularly small and medium-sized firms. Keeping in mind the overriding aim of poverty reduction and 
inclusive growth, future research into trade facilitation may need to examine this issue more closely. 
 
 
16 Trade facilitation may also benefit women, therefore contributing to gender equality. Indeed, countries with 
higher scores on the ease of doing business have large shares of women in the ranks of both entrepreneurs and 
workers. The reduction of bribery in connection with trade processes appears to be particularly important in that 
context, as studies have shown that women are seen as easy targets for this kind of practice (World Bank, 2007). 
17 See United Nations/CEFACT, 2001 for a list of measures.    
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Annex  
LIST OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COVERING TRADE 
FACILITATION  
Title of agreement  Type*  Status  Trade facilitation (others) 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-
operation Agreement  
PTA 
 




Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement  
FTA 
 








In force since 1993 
 
Yes. separate agreements 
http://www.aseansec.org/19046.htm 
Agreement on Free Trade between the 
Government of the Republic of Georgia and the 










Agreement between the Government of Republic 
of Armenia and the Government of Republic of 




In force since 1995 
 
 
Yes. Only to the extend of customs-
related aspects of the rules of origin 
 








Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial 
Technical and Economic Cooperation  
FA  
 




The European Union and the Republic of Armenia 





In force since 1999 
 
 
Yes. Protocol on mutual assistance 
between administrative authorities 
in customs matters 
Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore 
on a Closer Economic Partnership 
FTA 
 




Agreement between Japan and the Republic of 
Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership   FTA  In force since 2002  Yes 
Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement   FTA  In force since 2003  Yes 








ASEAN-India Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
FA 
 




















India-Thailand Framework Agreement for 
Establishing a FTA 
FA 
 




Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of 
Korea and Chile 
FTA 
 




United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement   FTA  In force since 2004  Yes 
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement  FTA  In force since 2004  Yes 
Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement  FTA  In force since 2004  Yes 








Agreement between Japan and the United 
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The Association Agreement Establishing the Free 
Trade Area between the Republic of Turkey and 










Free Trade Agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of Korea and the Government of 

























Yes. Article 18 -parties will 
Endeavour to implement measures 
which facilitate trade within the 
FTA; trade facilitation coordinated 
with wider region 








Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, New 


















Free Trade Agreement between the Government 
of the People's Republic of China and the 







Yes. Article 10 on border measures 
 
 
Preferential Trade Agreement between the 








Yes. Article XIV on customs 
valuation, Article XV on Customs 
Cooperation 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the 











Yes. Chapter 4 on Customs 
procedures, Chapter 5 on Paperless 
trading and Chapter 6 on Mutual 
recognition 
Agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of 





Yes. Customs procedures, chapter 4 
 
Republic of Korea-United States Free Trade 
Agreement  FTA  Pending ratification  Yes. customs procedures 
Protocol between the Republic of Peru and the 
Kingdom of Thailand to Accelerate the 














Source: ESCAP APTIAD Database, http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/, September 2007. 
*Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA); Free Trade Agreement (FTA); Framework Agreement (FA); Customs Union (CU) 
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